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Bibliographies Section
Philosophy & Religion
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Trans.
D.W. Robertson, Jr. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958.
Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Truth and Logic.
NY: Dover Publications.nd.
[H, R 5/00 "radical empiricism"]
[Although interesting, Ayer's attempt
to define philosophy based on a radical empiricism is comparable to attempting
to define human beings only after having cut out their hearts and cut off
their feet and arms.]
Bacon, Sir Francis. (1561-1626) Advancement of Learning;
Novum Organum; New Atlantis. Great Books of the Western World, Vol.
30. Ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins & Mortimer J. Adler. Chicago: William
Benton; c. 1952 -- Encyclopaedia Britannica. [R,
N7]
He later claimed that it was at Cambridge as a student not
yet sixteen that "he first fell into the dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle,"
which he judged to be "barren of the production of works for the benefit
of the life of man." (from "Biographical Note," v)
This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen:
who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety
of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors
(chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the
cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of
nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation
of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant
in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which
is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the
stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider
worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of
learning, admirable for the fineness of the thread and work, but of no
substance or profit.
(Advancement, 12)
Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect, in those
which are governors in universities, of consultation, and in princes or
superior persons, of visitation: to enter into account and consideration,
whether the readings, exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning,
anciently began and since continued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon
to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient.
(Advancement, 31)
And generally, let this be a rule, that all partitions of knowledges
be accepted rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations;
and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. (Advancement,
49)
And being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through,
this writing seemeth to me ("si nunquam fallit imago"), as far as
a man can judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound
which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments: which
is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter
afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses,
that they may play that have better hands. (Advancement, 95)
There is another powerful and great cause of the little advancement
of the sciences, which is this: it is impossible to advance properly in
the course when the goal is not properly fixed. (Novum Organum,
#81, p. 120)
Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will. Trans. F.L. Pogson. NY:
Harper Torchbooks, 1960 [1910] [R,
N7]
Carnap, Rudolph. The Logical Syntax of Language.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1937. [R,
N7]
Cassirer, Ernst. The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and
History Since Hegel. Trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W.
Hendel. New Haven: Yale U.P. 1950. [BD163/.C35] [R,
N7]
Coomaraswamy, A.K. Figures of Speech and Figures of Thought.
London, 1946. (S=Eliade, Sacred, 237.)
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy. 8 vols. Newman
Press, new rev ed. 1963-1966. [H,R]
Cummins, Saxe & Robert N. Lenscott eds. Man & the Universe:
The Philosophers of Science. NY: Random House. 1947. [H,
R, N7]
Descartes, Rene. "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the
Reason." In The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Trans. E.S. Haldane
& G.R.T. Ross. 2 vols., Dover. 1931. Vol. 1, 79-130. [R,
N7]
_____. A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings.
Trans. John Veitch. NY: E.P. Durron, 1951.
Eliade, Mircea. The Myth of the Eternal Return. N.Y., 1954.
_____. The Sacred and the Profane:
The Nature of Religion. Trans. Willard R. Trask. NY: Harcourt, Brace
& World, 1959. [BL / 48 / .E413; R,
N7]
Gonzalez, Justo L. A History of Christian Thought. Vol II: From Augustine
to the Eve of the Reformation. Nashville: Abingdon Press. 1971. [HR,
N7]
Hegel, G.W.F. Philosophy of Fine Art. Trans. F.P.B. Osmaston.
London: G. Biel & Sons, 1920. [S= Miles, J. Style,
182.]
_____ . Philosophy of History. Trans. J. Sibree. NY: Collier,
1901. [R, N7]
Hirschberger, Johannes. A Short History of Western Philosophy. Trans.
Jeremy Moiser. Boulder, CO: Questview [?] Press, 1976. [R,
N7]
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 35. Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc. 1952. 447-509. [R, N7]
"Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on moral,
political,
or physical subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience,
and to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different
from each other." (Note on page 465.)
"It might reasonably be expected in questions
which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the
first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms,
at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries,
in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the
true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy it may seem to give
exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions,
not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination?
But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a
quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy
has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume
that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants
affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as
the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual;
otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together;
it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they
could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when
they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides,
in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists.
It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely
beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin
of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits,
they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive
at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of
common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the
dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the
antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each
other." (478)
"The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and
dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side,
and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves
precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined.; nor have
they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate
or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends
their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from
a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never
remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations
and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become
sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its
most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations;
such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve,
and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice
against antagonists." (508)
[Final paragraph:]
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume;
of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it
contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does
it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion. (509)
Luther:
Bainton, Roland H. Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther. NY:
Abindon Press, 1950.[R, N7]
Malinowski, B. Myth in Primitive Psychology. London, 1926. (S=Eliade,
Sacred, 240.)
More, Thomas. Utopia. Trans. Paul Turner. Penguin Books, 1965.
[H,R]
Nietzsche. The Use and Abuse of History. Trans. Adrian Collins.
Bobbs-Merrill, 1949, 1957. [R,
N7]
Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy. London, 1923, 1929. (S=Eliade,
Sacred, 236.)
Polyanyi, Michael, & Harry Prosch. Meaning. Chicago: U. of
Chicago Press, 1975. [R,
N7]
Russell, Bertrand. Bertrand Russell's Best. Ed. Rober E. Egner.
NY: Mentor, 1958. [H,R, Quotations
]
Stace, W.T. Time and Eternity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion.
Princeton UP, 1952. [R,
N7]
Trawick, Buckner. The Bible as Literature:
The New Testament. NY: Barnes & Noble, 1968. [H,
R, N7]
_____.. The Bible as Literature: The Old Testament
& the Apocrypha. NY: Barnes & Noble, 1970. [H,
R, N7]
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations.
Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. In Adler, Mortimer, J. (Ed.) Great Books of
the Western World. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1990.
"...how we group words into kinds [P.o.S.
-EV] will depend on the aim of the classification, -- and on our
own inclination." (320)
"Asking 'Is this object a composite?' outside a particular language-game
is like what a boy once did, who had to say whether the verbs in certain
sentences were in the active or passive voice, and who racked his brains
over the question whether the verb "to sleep" meant something active or
passive." (328)
"122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not
command
a clear view of the use of our words. -- Our grammar is lacking in
this sort of perspicuity." (343)
(271) "Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though
nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism." (368)
"569. Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now
perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which
concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet
and inches as well as in metres and centimeters; the difference is merely
one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations
in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is posible
for us to give to them." (398) [Concepts of linguistic
grammars take more time and trouble than school children are able to give
to them, i.e., the focus is shifted to the grammar and away from such things
as meaning and style.]
"570. Concepts lead us to make investigations;
are the expressions of our interest, and direct our interest." (398)
[Linguistic grammars lead our interest to the development of grammar during
the pre-school years.]
"A man's thinking goes on within his consciousness
in a seclusion in comparison with which any physical seclusion is an exhibition
to public view." (435)
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